Patrick Riordan

President Trump’s executive order commanding the suspension of all USAID’s support for projects in poor countries shocked many for its callous disregard for the human suffering caused by this sudden withdrawal of finance. Similarly, his administration’s harsh treatment of migrants seemed an affront not merely to the requirement of compassion but a snub to any doctrine of the equal dignity of all persons grounding their human rights. When Vice President J. D. Vance attempted to justify these inhumane policies by invoking Catholic theology, specifically citing the notion of the order of charity, ordo amoris, the reaction of many Christians was understandably one of horror. The vice president seemed to invoke a traditional account of the hierarchy of responsibilities in order to dismiss some important duties altogether from the list, because located very low on the scale. Pope Francis wrote a letter to the bishops of the US reaffirming the Catholic stance on the duty to love all and rejecting the appeal to a scale: ‘Christian love is not a concentric expansion of interests that little by little extend to other persons and groups.’¹ He explicitly identifies the ‘initiation of a program of mass deportations’ in the US as the context for his writing:

Jesus Christ, loving everyone with a universal love, educates us in the permanent recognition of the dignity of every human being, without exception. In fact, when we speak of ‘infinite and transcendent dignity’, we wish to emphasise that the most decisive value possessed by the human person surpasses and sustains every other juridical consideration that can be made to regulate life in society. Thus, all the Christian faithful and people of good will are called upon to consider the legitimacy of norms and public policies in the light of the dignity of the person and his or her fundamental rights, not vice versa.²

This tendency to be selective, giving preferential treatment to some persons and some interests, and attempting to justify the partiality by invoking philosophical or theological principles, is found not only in these cases of foreign aid and treatment of migrants. Among the terms invoked by J. D. Vance is ‘postliberalism’, by means of which he attempts to ally himself with many Catholic critics of liberalism and neoliberalism. While accepting the validity of much of the criticism of liberal regimes, I am concerned that the overriding critical tenor may erode the solid core of value of ‘liberty’. What kind of liberty do they still espouse, once they have dismissed liberalism and neoliberalism and adopted postliberalism? That is my concern in this article, and it is motivated by the commitment to liberty in Catholic Social Teaching since Pope John XXIII.

In a book review article in a recent issue of Studies, Peadar Kirby summarised succinctly the central traits of the doctrine of neoliberalism as ‘the primacy of the market over the state, competition as the guiding principle of social life, the commodification of more and more spheres of life down to the most intimate, and an individualised hyper-consumption as its ubiquitous culture’.³ One might add to this list of traits the emphasis on deregulation, the privatisation of public utilities, and the marketisation and the commodification of education. Recent experience shows how policies implemented in the name of competition result in monopolies, policies implemented for the sake of efficiency result in the deterioration of infrastructure and a worsening in the quality of service and goods provided. A considerable literature is now emerging highlighting these disastrous consequences of the political adoption and implementation of this doctrine. But when one searches for a systematic defence of neoliberalism, it proves to be elusive. On the one hand, there is the academic discussion of ideas from the originating thinkers, as exemplified by Kevin Vallier’s excellent article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.⁴ On the other hand is the evidence of the political impact of relevant ideas when they are taken up by political movements, which when in power have the opportunity to advance sectional interests in the name of universal values. What originated as an attempt to find a balance between markets and states became the dogma of the priority of markets over states, seemingly in ignorance of the recognition that any well-functioning market requires state support and the necessity of state action in cases of market failure. Aware of the distortion that ideas suffer when they become part of a political campaign, I want to strengthen our intellectual resources for speaking of those liberties we wish to uphold and defend against erosion.

Along the spectrum of political ideologies, there are few to be found that explicitly deny the value of liberty and that exclude an embrace of freedom as among the essential values they hope to realise in their political activity. ‘Ideology’ is used here, not in the Marxist pejorative sense of the dissemination of illusion (partial interest masquerading as universal), but in the sense of ‘a set of ideas that provides the basis for organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify, or overthrow the existing system of power’.⁵ From anarchy at one end of the spectrum to autocracy at the other end, each ideology advocates for freedom as understood by the proponents and denigrates the visions of liberty and liberation embraced by their opponents. Why choose those poles of anarchy and autocracy, apart from the attraction of alliteration? Why not place tyranny at the end of the spectrum? A few constitutions written or unwritten allow for a particular office named ‘dictator’, magistrates given absolute power in times of emergency but not without the requirement of subsequent accountability. But there are few if any proponents of a political ideology proudly advocating tyranny or totalitarian government. These labels are usually applied by opponents and are intended to be denigratory. The espoused ideology will usually present itself in terms that are appealing and seemingly persuasive. Words like ‘justice’ and ‘liberty’ are almost ubiquitous in the self-presentation of ideologies. Inevitably then there will be disputes among the theorists and practitioners as to the ‘true’ or ‘correct’ or ‘best’ meaning of the term. These debates generate volumes that fill the libraries of departments of political philosophy. What is Justice? What is Liberty? What is Equality?

The debates are not only academic, however, but have real political bite, not necessarily via the clarification of subtle distinctions but through the demonisation of opposing positions. The rhetoric of the Brexit debates was redolent with the values and ideas of freedom, but not always expressed as such. ‘Take back control’ sought freedom from the domination of Brussels bureaucrats, ‘recover our sovereignty’ aspired to a freedom to enter into trade deals without the constraints of EU regulation, and the Remain campaign’s warning about the illusions of the promised freedom were demonised as ‘Project Fear’, fear of the unknown when vast vistas of opportunity for action would be opened up.

When speaking about ‘liberalism’, not least in the context of promoting my recent book, Human Dignity and Liberal Politics: Catholic Possibilities for the Common Good,⁶ I have frequently encountered the reaction of people who ask, ‘What is liberalism? What does “liberal” mean? There are so many versions, so many different definitions!’ Implied in this reaction is the view, not always directly expressed, that with so many varying ideas about liberty and freedom, it will be impossible to have a rational conversation, and so it is best to avoid the topic. Well, I disagree with this stance. Given the possibility of confusion, and even deception, because of the fluidity of the terms, all the more reason to devote careful attention to sorting out what is important and what is at issue when confusion and disagreement occur. This belongs among the tasks of philosophy, to provide some intellectual housekeeping, seeking clarity and precision, to tidy up loose ends and to highlight traps and dangers. To illustrate the point, consider the spontaneous stance taken by people who assume that advocacy for the common good entails an opposition to individualism and human rights. They spontaneously think in terms of polarities and must overcome this dialectical way of thinking to appreciate that there is no contradiction in embracing both. Commitment to common goods can espouse human rights rooted in the dignity of human persons because the formulation and protection of such rights belongs among the goods in common in any decent society. It is not ‘either-or’ but ‘both-and’. Not every misunderstanding can be so neatly tidied away, however. We can discover real differences in the values we espouse, even if we give them the same name, liberty. And the heated debates about the various values can provoke a polarisation that results in the demonisation of some positions. This is the effect I wish to highlight so that it can be avoided. This too was on the agenda of my book, which asked in chapter five ‘Is Liberalism the Enemy?’ Very valid criticisms in the theological literature of the excesses of some liberal regimes have given the impression that liberalism in all its forms is incompatible with Christian faith. There is definitely a theological danger of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, given the Catholic Church’s espousal of the importance of human liberty and especially (but not only) of religious liberty in the Vatican Council’s declaration Dignitatis Humanae and the commitment of recent popes, especially Pope Benedict XVI, in advocating for liberty.

Basic distinctions

To contribute to the necessary housekeeping with a view to avoiding misunderstanding and to defuse some overheated criticisms, I offer the following clarifications. When terms such as ‘liberty’, ‘liberalism’, and ‘liberation’ are used, it is helpful to ask whether the reference is to an ideology – a set of concepts, values, and principles – or to a particular political regime. If the reference is to a regime, does the regime in question espouse an ideology of liberalism, or is it used as a term of abuse by others? It is well- known that ‘liberal’ is used differently on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In the US, ‘liberal’ is often used dismissively, associating the term with left- wing positions, including communism. In Europe the term is often used to label those opposed to communism and who may therefore appear more on the right of politics, espousing protection for property rights and economic liberties, for instance. Even then, we can note variations in the countries of Europe where parties labelled ‘liberal’ can range from nationalistic (Austria) to capitalist (Germany). Depending on the context, ‘liberal’ can be a term of abuse, or it can be a label identifying a core value and commitment.

With any particular regime, there can always be the question of how well it succeeds in realising the values it espouses, and experience allows us to speculate that the achievement will always fall short of the aspiration.

My focus is not primarily on actual regimes and their greater or less espousal of liberty, or the greater or less success in realising their ambition. I want instead to focus on liberalism as an ideology – a set of concepts, values, and principles – that animates a political movement, party, or constitution.

Liberalism as ideology

Given the great range of such political ideologies, a possible way forward is to postulate a common theme and to move beyond the commonality to identify the divergences. I suggest that the doctrine of liberalism specifies the rationale, purpose, and limits of state authority and power in terms of serving and facilitating human liberties. This does not rule out other relevant considerations, such as public order, the rule of law, equality, equity, or justice. Note how this account can accommodate social welfare policies that are needed to serve and facilitate people’s free agency. The doctrine of liberalism concentrates on human freedom but without excluding other values. For instance, the French slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity identifies three aspirations, but liberty comes first. I don’t want to read too much into this priority, but it serves to illustrate the point about the centre and aureole or periphery. There is rarely just one value at stake in any ideology, but there is usually a dominant one.

This proposed summary account of liberalism as a doctrine that specifies the rationale, purpose, and limits of state authority and power in terms of serving and facilitating human liberties allows us to map out the range of possible ideologies that might conform to this central ideal type, while possibly differing radically from one another. A number of questions are provoked by the summary account, the answers to which then characterise the typical liberal positions. Which human liberties do we have in mind? Who are the people whose liberties we concentrate on? These two questions are often answered together.

Liberty as (political) independence

In the post-colonial situation, as in the situation in Europe following the collapse of various empires, the demand for liberty referred primarily to the demand to be free of the power and authority of an imperial or colonial entity, and to have the freedom of self-determination. Freedom from the oppressive power is a condition for freedom of a people to rule themselves. For independence movements, the subject of liberty is a collective, a people, a nation. Liberty as independence stresses the freedom from outside control. Independence movements have often been nationalistic, with a rhetoric focused on a nation whose desire for freedom is to rule itself, free from interference from other powers. Home rule, self-rule, self-determination are typical slogans in the movement seeking liberty as independence for a nation. Frequently, after independence is achieved, the tension latent in the difference between liberalism and nationalism can emerge in a debate about the nature and distribution of liberty. A republican perspective will emphasise the liberty to be enjoyed by the people, the nation, a liberty achieved in successful self-government in which all participate. Freedom is for the collective exercise of rule, free from domination by other powers, guiding the destiny of the whole. More recent formulation has distinguished the idea of non-domination as the distinctive notion of republican liberty, and with this emphasis, the focus on the whole in republican thought is not to the exclusion of the liberty of individuals.⁷ As noted, after gaining independence, the tension between the liberty of individual citizens and freedom of the collective emerged in various regimes and was resolved sometimes in favour of individual liberties, sometimes in favour of the freedom of the people, and sometimes maintaining a healthy balance. In the context of discussing same-sex marriage, I have noted how the spirit of the Irish constitution has evolved from being republican to being liberal, illustrated in the adoption of the rhetoric of rights in the name of liberty and equality.⁸

Independence of all authority

This brief essay is not an attempt to conduct a history of political regimes, much less a history of political thought, but it is impossible to explore key ideas without some acknowledgement of their origins. In France the campaign for independence was not directed against a foreign power but against the ancien regime, the coalition between the monarchy, the aristocracy, and the Catholic Church. The freedoms sought were being denied by these traditional authorities, so the remark often attributed to Denis Diderot, ‘men will never be free until the last king is strangled with the entrails of the last priest’, was taken to express a central concern of the movement for liberty and the rights of man. The anticlericalism of the Enlightenment suggested to established authorities in Church and state that the demand for liberty was at the same time a demand for the overthrowing of those authorities. Sadly, the emergence of a concern for liberty in human history was associated with the denial of authority, and the church leadership reacted defensively in her anti-modernist policies under Pius IX and subsequent popes.

One possible meaning for liberty as ‘freedom from’ entailed the rejection and even destruction of moral and ecclesiastical authority. It proved impossible in practice to erect a political regime on the rejection of political authority, although the prospect of rejecting all authority survives in the vibrancy of anarchism, an ideology predicated on an extreme valuing of liberty. But one would not need to look to the pole of anarchy to find these ideas of freedom in contemporary discourse. Freedom as autonomy is one popular theme.

Liberty as autonomy

Autonomy favours the idea proposed by Immanuel Kant that to be free is to be subject to a law that one gives oneself. Defenders of this approach sometimes overlook or downplay the qualifications added by Kant, that the law one gives oneself should conform to reason and not be oriented to the gratification of sensual pleasures or material preferences.⁹ Autonomy is opposed to heteronomy understood as being subject to laws that have their source outside oneself. Laws supposedly rooted in human nature are often included in this delineation of the outside, not only divine authority, ecclesiastical authority, but also any human authority demanding obedience.

The rejection of heteronomy exemplifies the ‘freedom from’ ambitioned in the tradition of pursuing liberty, and the powers from which one desires to be free are many and varied. As this short survey of ideas illustrates, they can be imperialist or colonial powers, they can be church authorities, they can be established rulers and inherited regimes. Being free from constraint and oppression opens up the question what one will want to be free to do. This question too has found many answers.

Libertarianism as the exaggeration of individual liberty

Robert Nozick wrote his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) in reaction to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) in a deliberate attempt to posit an account of justice rooted in the natural rights of individuals and oppose it to the distributive tendencies in Rawls’s model. Where Rawls accepted the priority of liberty but wanted also to accommodate equality among the central values of a fair society, Nozick opted for a robust account of liberty that would allow no diminution to facilitate equality. If a fostering of equality as political value would always entail some trade-off with liberty, it could not be acceptable to anyone who prioritised liberty. The natural rights of individuals are the touchstone of validity, chief among which is the right to property. A selective reading of John Locke was used for the assertion of natural rights. This highlighting of individual liberty, labelled libertarianism, was adopted by many who favoured the entailed positions of a minimal state and economic freedoms.

Liberty as exercise of consumer choice

For many people in the world today, the opportunity to access a great range of goods is a freedom to which they aspire. Through various media, they can see what is on offer to others in the world, and they look with envy on the conspicuous consumption in lifestyles they envy but cannot access. They desire the freedom to have and enjoy those products that are available to others. Such desires for liberty and marketed goods are not confined to the world of the ‘have-nots’. The freedom in question here is economic in the limited sense of consumerist. Individuals and households exemplify this liberty. However, it is a liberty constrained by what is made available in the market.

Liberty for capital: neoliberalism

The production side of the economy is also concerned with liberty. Without the freedom to experiment with new products, apply new technologies, and enter into markets, the achievements since the Industrial Revolution would have been negligible.¹⁰ But the demand for the relevant freedoms took a new turn with the initiatives of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, who advocated the withdrawal of government from markets, the removal of constricting regulation, and the privatisation of utilities and services in the expectation that business and the market would be more efficient. The political movement associated with deregulation, privatisation, and marketisation is usually labelled neoliberalism. The ‘neo’ in ‘neoliberalism’ reflects the new stance that state involvement in the market is always detrimental, as opposed to previous kinds of economic liberalism in which the need for government regulation of markets and intervention in cases of market failure was accepted.

From the eighteenth century, commentators have been aware of the demands of merchants and entrepreneurs to be freed from the constraints that limit their ability to make profit. Increasingly the entities demanding liberty are not simply individuals but are corporations, legal persons, demanding that they be freed from the restrictions of regulation. Often there are good reasons for their demands, as for instance, when trade in foodstuffs was hampered by the need to pay a toll at every bridge and on every stretch of road, making the food delivered to the populations of urban centres prohibitively expensive. At the same time as they demand the removal of restraining regulations, they insist on the protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights secured by patents and trademarks; they want contracts to be enforced; and they require civil authorities to ensure the value of the currency. But as Adam Smith noted in his 1776 book, Wealth of Nations, markets unregulated cannot be relied upon to deliver outcomes that benefit everyone. There are merchants who are motivated to prioritise their own interests, who are prepared to take advantage of gullible consumers. Hence his recommendation that merchants must be forced to compete and must be prevented from forming cartels or monopolies that could dictate prices and so generate exploitative profits. It is a misdescription to represent him as advocating ‘free’ markets, since he insisted on constraining market participants to compete.¹¹

William Kingston has noted the success of business interests in persuading politicians to remove the regulations originally introduced to ensure that markets would function for the public good. The creation and introduction of limited liability by the Irish parliament in the eighteenth century explicitly denied this privilege to financial entities dealing in money. Gradually those reasonable constraints were removed by parliaments in Britain, France, and the US, as a result of successful lobbying by banking interests. The scandals of Enron’s collapse and the credit crisis of the twenty-first century were the ultimate outcome of this deregulation. As Kingston argues, the financialisation of the economy deters innovation, since investors stand to make greater returns by speculating on the finance markets than by investing in technological development. The title of his book puts it succinctly: How Capitalism Destroyed Itself: Technology Displaced by Financial Innovation.¹²

Minorities’ liberties

The anti-woke agenda of some politicians in the UK and in the US may suit a populist agenda of demonising groups that can be depicted as jeopardising the well-being of ‘the people’, whereby ‘the people’ is a creation of the populist rhetoric.¹³ But politicians are probably unaware that their polemic targeted at the offending groups is also in danger of undermining the core values of liberty on which they too depend. There may be some validity to the concern that identity politics may occupy too much of the political space, so that the interests of minorities crowd out the shared interests of all in public well- being. Those interests include security and safety on the streets; the rule of law; general oracy, literacy, and numeracy as preconditions for social life; and a functioning social welfare net. Politics concerned for the good of all must be attentive to those groups that are overlooked, or worse, deliberately excluded from a share in the enjoyment of the benefits of political cooperation. Those excluded are not necessarily minorities: apart from the extreme cases of racial segregation (US) and apartheid (RSA), feminist movements have made us aware of the marginalisation of a significant proportion of the population. Campaigns in various jurisdictions have focused on ethnic, or religious, or gendered, or migrant minorities whose liberties have been denied them. Whatever might be said about the validity of the arguments in any particular case, the values of freedom at stake are fundamental to human dignity and a decent existence, and it must be appropriate to campaign for correction and redress when real dynamics of exclusion are identified. As noted, a political forum occupied solely by identity politics will be impoverished in terms of articulated concerns for shared goods, but a polity committed to shared values of liberty and equality and justice cannot allow exclusions of some groups if the commitment is to be authentic. The demonisation of ‘identity politics’ by anti-woke politicians is in danger of denying the core value of liberty that is at stake.

The Catholic Church on liberty

I suggested in the introduction that the doctrine of liberalism specifies the rationale, purpose, and limits of state authority and power in terms of serving and facilitating human liberties. This does not rule out other relevant considerations, such as public order, the rule of law, equality, equity, or justice. Commitment to human freedom does not exclude commitment to other values. Among the clarifications – one might even say innovations – introduced by the Second Vatican Council is a specification of the purpose of the political community in terms of human freedoms.

The council recognised the growing awareness of the dignity of the human person, and the insistence on the liberties and rights of persons, which should be acknowledged and protected in civil law.¹⁴ Gaudium et Spes underlines the central purpose of state power being the protection of human freedoms:

A clearer awareness of human dignity has given rise in various parts of the world to a movement to establish a politico-juridical order that will provide better protection for the rights of women and men in public life – the right of free assembly and association, for example, the right to express one’s opinions and to profess one’s religion privately and publicly. The guarantee of the rights of the person is, indeed, a necessary condition for citizens, individually and collectively, to play an active part in public life and administration.¹⁵

The council insists on inclusivity, condemning factionalism and the exclusion of ‘large numbers through avarice and political crimes’.¹⁶ The following section shifts the focus to the common good but without losing sight of the fundamental value of liberty. The political community is said to exist for the sake of the common good, in which it finds its full justification, and significance and the source of its inherent legitimacy. In case a reader might be tempted to read this formulation as a juxtaposition between persons with rights and the common good, the immediately following sentence explains the relationship: ‘The common good embraces the sum total of all those conditions of social life that enable individuals, families, and organisations to achieve complete and effective fulfilment.’¹⁷ A footnote provides reference to a source of this idea in Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Mater et Magistra (1961), where this understanding of the common good was first developed.

The relationship posited here is between conditions and purposes, means and goals. The goals and purposes are those of persons and their communities, the conditions and means are the responsibility of civil authorities. The priority lies with the former, which had been established earlier in the pastoral constitution in the chapter on the human community. Having expressed respect for the dignity of persons, and the rights and duties that flow from that, the council added: ‘The social order and its development must constantly yield to the good of the person, since the order of things must be subordinate to the order of persons, and not the other way around.’¹⁸ While English translations of church documents often rely on the word ‘state’ to render the thought meaningfully, the Latin of the originals does not have a term for state. ‘Political community’ is often translated as state, but in fact it is used to embrace elements that in English would usually be distinguished from state, such as the economy, civil society, intermediate organisations. Similarly, ‘public authorities’ is the term usually used for government. The term translated here as social order is comprehensive in embracing all the elements of political community as listed, including the state, the economy, and civil society. The message therefore is a strong and clear one, these orders of social existence are for the good of the person, and it is reinforced by a reference to the Gospel, ‘as the Lord suggested when he said that the sabbath was made for men and women and not men and women for the sabbath’.¹⁹

Liberties as listed in the text are among the fundamental conditions for persons to pursue their fulfilment. As such, liberties are intrinsic to the goods in common for people in political community. In the partner declaration on religious liberty, Dignitatis Humanae, the council stresses the importance that the truth be recognised in freedom and that faith must be a free response to the proclamation of the Gospel. There should be no imposition or coercion in religious matters: people should not be coerced to conform their religious behaviour against their conscience, nor should they be prevented from following their conscience in carrying out their religious duties, alone or with others, provided the requirements of public order are respected.²⁰

Conclusion

This brief survey of ideologies draws attention to the complexity in the rhetoric around liberty. In the context of the doctrine of liberalism as specifying the rationale, purpose, and limits of state authority and power in terms of serving and facilitating human liberties, the twin questions of whose liberty and which liberty were raised. At the risk of oversimplification, the matrix of answers might allow for a mapping of positions. The subject of liberty can

be variously identified in political campaigns as individual persons, citizens, property owners, consumers, organisations such as Churches, excluded or marginalised groups, business corporations, peoples and nations. Similarly, the liberties sought can be those listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as freedoms of speech, conscience, religion, assembly, marriage, to take a job and exercise a profession, to marry, and more general liberties, such as to buy and consume and enjoy a variety of products, to be free as a nation from the domination of colonial or imperial powers so as to participate in self-government, to be free as capitalists from state regulation, to be free as members of distinct identity groups to enjoy the same liberties as are available to fellow citizens.

The range of subjects and objects of freedom listed here suggests that whenever liberty or liberalism is a focus of attention, it is appropriate to ask which subjects of liberty are in question and which liberties are being defended or advocated. The corresponding questions are about the subjects, groups, and liberties that are either taken for granted or are deliberately excluded from consideration. Exclusion of persons, groups, and some liberties is inevitably associated with some extreme or exaggerated claims. The unrestrained exercise of rights, the freedom to consume, to do business without being subject to regulation, to be free of all authority, might well attract moral criticism, but it is regrettable if that criticism suppresses awareness of genuine liberties that deserve promotion and protection. And it is also regrettable if the demonisation of some liberties lends support to contemporary authoritarian political movements that jeopardise legitimate liberties, especially the liberties of marginalised and excluded groups. This is precisely the concrete situation that occasioned Pope Francis’s recent letter in which he exhorts ‘all the faithful of the Catholic Church, and all men and women of good will, not to give in to narratives that discriminate against and cause unnecessary suffering to our migrant and refugee brothers and sisters’.²¹ The Trump administration’s narrative is to be resisted, the more so because it appears couched in religious language. But for Francis, this does not prevent it being ‘an ideological criterion that distorts social life and imposes the will of the strongest as the criterion of truth’.²²

Patrick Riordan SJ is Senior Fellow in Political Philosophy and Catholic Social Thought at Campion Hall, Oxford. He has written a number of books on the common good, such as Global Ethics and Global Common Goods

(London: Bloomsbury, 2015), and Recovering Common Goods (Dubin: Veritas, 2017). His most recent publication is Human Dignity and Liberal Politics: Catholic Opportunities for the Common Good (Georgetown UP, 2023).

Notes

1. Pope Francis, ‘Letter of the Holy Father Francis to the Bishops of the United States of America’, letter, 10 February 2025, 6, www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2025/ documents/20250210-lettera-vescovi-usa.html
2. Pope Francis, ‘Letter to the Bishops of the United States’, 3.
3. Peadar Kirby, ‘Countering the Neoliberal Story’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 113 (2024–25),p. 353.
4. Kevin Vallier, ‘Neoliberalism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (website), https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/neoliberalism/
5. Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 3^rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 12.
6. Patrick Riordan, Human Dignity and Liberal Politics: Catholic Possibilities for the Common Good (Georgetown, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2023).
7. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
8. Patrick Riordan, ‘The Purpose of the Law: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 103 (2014), pp. 10–19.
9. Immanuel Kant, Ground work of the Metaphysics of Morals(1785), trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1959).
10. Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, Why Liberalism Works: How True Liberal Values Produce a Freer, More Equal, Prosperous World for All (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).
11. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), pp. 145, 267.
12. William Kingston, How Capitalism Destroyed Itself: Technology Displaced by Financial Innovation, (Cheltenham UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2017), reviewed by me in Studies (106), pp. 381–386.
13. Nadia Urbinati, Me the People: How Populism Transforms Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), p. 77.
14. GaudiumetSpes, in Austin Flannery (ed), Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1996), 73.
15. Gaudiumet Spes, 73.
16. Gaudium et Spes, 73.
17. Gaudium et Spes, 74.
18. Gaudium et Spes, 26.
19. Gaudium et Spes, 26.
20. Dignitatis Humanae, in Austin Flannery (ed), VaticanCouncil II: Constitutions ,Decrees, Declarations (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1996), 2.
21. Pope Francis, ‘Letter to the Bishops of the United States’, 9.
22. Pope Francis, ‘Letter to the Bishops of the United States’, 7.